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*
 
  Tamás Vasvári 
The management of the Hungarian municipal sector has received special attention since the 
crisis in 2008 and interest in the sector increased further due to the changes in legislation in 
2011. A great number of economy experts and speakers on behalf of the government or the 
municipalities provided further details on prevailing issues in the municipal sector, however, 
their assessment of the severity of these issues varied greatly. By describing the logical 
framework of the deficit mechanism this study aims to evaluate the processes behind the 
situation of today in order to forecast the situation of tomorrow as regards the management of 
municipalities. According to the mechanism, if the deficit of a municipal budget (the operating, 
investment, financing budget or reserves) can only be eliminated by the upward adjustment of 
financing revenues, it will lead, in the end to increasing municipal indebtedness. Increasing 
indebtedness, as a rule, results in increasing debt service. Although these expenditures are part 
of the financing budget, in practice they are usually financed from other budgets. Therefore, 
increasing debt service can be a potential cause of reorganization in operation, the 
postponement of investments, an increasing asset disposal activity, refinancing with new 
borrowings or a drop in reserves. In addition to these, the phenomenon called the crowding out 
effect of debt service may at the same time improve the GFS balance of municipalities. 
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Introduction 
The management of Hungarian municipalities was in the spotlight in 2011 both at the macro and the 
micro levels. Interest in the issue has started to increase at the end of 2010 when a debt settlement 
process ended in Szigetvár and shortly after another commenced in Esztergom. These cases were 
unprecedented in the 15-year history of municipal debt settlement which had been considered so far a 
“small-town” or village phenomenon. In early 2011 the Central Bank of Hungary notified the 
government and the public first and later the Ministry for National Economy also confirmed that the 
ESA deficit target for 2010 was not met principally because the deficit of the municipal sector was 
higher than expected. In May 2011 the Ministry of Internal Affairs made public its programme for the 
reform of the municipal sector which provoked intense and dissatisfied responses from both municipal 
executives and experts of the sector. Since then, the government has outlined several concepts 
although these are not in any way reflected in the new cardinal Act on Local Governments of Hungary 
passed by the Parliament on 19th December 2011. The Parliament, however, had already begun the 
construction of the new municipal system a few months earlier by introducing the Act on the 
Consolidation of County Governments. Meanwhile, the feedback of the international finance press on 
the new legislative environment escalated the issues of the municipal sector to the sovereign level. A 
number of expert reports were also published which differed in their estimation of the scope and depth 
of the financial crisis of municipalities. This paper does not aim to be the next in the line of these 
studies. Our purpose is rather to present the phases and feedback effects of the municipal deficit 
mechanism objectively, on the basis of a simple model. By evaluating this model, we will examine the 
financial management of municipalities from a novel aspect. Finally, we will assess the new legislative 
environment in the light of the municipal deficit mechanism. 
                                                     
*
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1. The features of the Hungarian municipality system 
The budget of the municipalities is part of public finances (Article 111(1) of the new Act on Local 
Governments of Hungary). Local operation, management and functions were specified until 2011 by 
the Act on Local Governments, the Act on Public Finances, the Act on Municipal Debt Adjustment, 
the Act on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises
1
 and numerous other regulations.
2
 
The balance sheet and budget of the municipalities are consolidated into the final account of general 
government at the end of each year. The municipalities provide public services which are financed – in 
addition to government grants – from local tax and fee revenue. The effectiveness of this financing 
structure is examined in detail by Vigvári (2002 and 2011). Let us note here only that the proportion of 
municipal own income and central transfers (block grants and transfers from the general government) 
defines decisively the income flexibility (Vigvári, 2010) and the financial standing of the 
municipalities. The revenues and expenditures of the general government may be accounted on accrual 
or cash basis. 
3
 This study shall refer to the cash basis concept of accounting by default as Hungarian 
public accounts are prepared – prior to any adjustments made on accrual basis – with this method. This 
means that deals are accounted when the related cash transfer is made and only items involving cash 
movements are accounted (P. Kiss, 2011), regardless of which budget period the economic event 
actually belongs to. The revenue and expenditure structure of municipalities may further be reported in 
functional or in economic classification. The functional classification groups cash transfers according 
to the public service provided (e.g. public education), while the economic classification reflects the 
nature and type of revenues (e.g. own income, such as taxes and fees and central transfers) and 
expenditures (e.g. material and payroll expenditures and related contributions). For this study, we will 
consider the economic structure by default. In our analysis we will separate the operating, the 
investment and the financial budget which reflects external financing activity. In many countries, 
general government institutions have to manage these budgets separately throughout the budget period 
(Vigvári, 2011) which prevents them from financing their operating deficit from asset disposal and 
long-term borrowings 
4
 (Vigvári, 2007). 
The structure of municipal revenues and expenditures, their development and relation may be 
described by different ratios and balances. A wide range of methods are examined in Vigvári (2002), 
Galbács (2009) and Simon (2011). We share here only the ratios which are relevant to this study: 
 Total balance: All revenues and expenditures incurred in a given budget year. The balance 
indicates the decrease or increase of reserves. 
 Operating balance: The result of operating revenues and expenditures. In this study we 
consider own income, block grants and transfers within and outside public as operating 
revenue, while, according to the economic classification, operating expenditures include 
material, payroll (with related contributions) and other operating expenditures which are 
related to compulsory and voluntary public services.
5
 It also includes received and paid 
interests. 
                                                     
1
 See the References section for the full Hungarian title of acts. 
2
 E.g. Government Decree No. 249/2000 (XII. 24.) 
3
 For further details on these accounting techniques and principles see Simon (2011). 
4
 In many countries running an operating deficit in municipal management is forbidden and is punished by law 
(Vigvári, 2011). 
5
 We emphasize that – despite some municipal practices when it is represented as (operating) revenue – the cash 
residue from prior years is not included in the operating budget because of its distorting effect. Cash reserves are 
linked to the budget through the total balance. 
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 Investment (capital) balance: The result of capital revenues (revenue from asset disposal, 
investment grants and other capital revenues) and expenditures (investments). The balance 
most often shows deficit as the investment expenses of a long-term project are represented 
with regard to a short period. 
 GFS balance 6: The GFS system is based on the registry of budget estimates and their 
fulfilment. It represents the actual expenditure of the state (municipality) on public goods and 
the nature of funds financing these activities (Simon, 2011). According to the methodology, 
capital movements will be removed both from revenues and expenditures, so the balance will 
not include either capital movements related to the municipality’s borrowing activity and nor 
the cash residue spared or spent, although the income from asset disposal may be represented 
as GFS revenue. The balance reflects the net financial position of the municipality (or the 
entire sector), that is, whether it is net borrower/reserve user or net debt payer/cash depositor. 
The European Union (e.g. the convergence criteria or the excessive deficit procedure) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (e.g. precautionary credit line agreements) apply the GFS 
methodology revised in 2001 to measure compliance with the requirements set for the deficit 
of sovereign (and municipal) debt (Vigvári, 2002). The GFSM2001 uses the accrual method 
7
 
while the reporting system laid down by the Act on the State Budget is based on the GFS86, 
developed by the IMF in 1986. Therefore, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office reports the 




 Financing balance: The balance shows the net movement of the financing activity. 
Borrowings are represented as income, while debt service (only capital) is considered as 
expense. 
9
 A surplus means increasing indebtedness, while a deficit means net debt service 
activity (decreasing debts). The GFS methodology does not take into account these items in its 
calculations. The balance is generally in surplus as borrowings are accounted in one sum while 
the related debt service extends to further periods. 
2. The deficit mechanism in municipal financial management 
We separate three plus one budget in the financial management of municipalities which make up a 
closed financing system. 
10
 These are the following: the (1) operating, (2) investment (capital), (3) 
financing budgets and (+1) reserves. By a closed financing system we mean that the non-zero balance 
or change of a budget will result in the non-zero balance or change of at least another budget. In our 
analysis we assume a typical situation, namely, that there is a deficit in one of the budgets (Figure 1). 
The deficit might be generated by the operating or the investment (together the GFS) budget, by the 
financing budget (net debt service), or by a latent lack of reserves. 
11
 If the deficit cannot be financed 
either from the surplus of the operating or the investment budget, or from reserves, 
12
 a need arises for 
                                                     
6
 Government Financial Statistics. See details about the development of and modifications to the methodology of 
the GFS statistics in Győrffy et al. (2009). 
7
 “This methodology agrees in concept with the ESA and with the developed European GFS.” (Győrffy et al. 
2009, pp. 524.) 
8
 For further details see KSH (2011). 
9
 Transfers related to financial investments (the purchasing and selling of state bonds) are also represented here. 
10
 In spite of a wide international experience and literature, in Hungary the cash flow of the budgets is not 
separated in practice, only in municipal reports. 
11
 As we will conclude later in this study, resolving the lack of reserves by borrowing was a typical motive 
behind the municipal bond issuances of 2007 and 2008. 
12
 In this case net debt service (financing deficit) will turn into net borrowing (financing surplus). 
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a surplus in the financial budget (net borrowing) which results in increasing indebtedness. Increasing 
indebtedness, in turn, results in increasing debt service. Debt service may be financed primarily from 
the cash flows of the financed project (Musgrave,1959; Kovács,2007; Vasvári,2009), nevertheless this 
principle is rarely put into practice in Hungary. Therefore, the debt service of Hungarian municipalities 
can be financed from decreasing reserves (total deficit), from financing income which translates into 
increasing indebtedness (debt spiral), or by the adjustment of the operating or the investment (together 
the GFS) budget. The latter can mean either the increase of operating or capital revenues 
13
 or the 
reduction of expenditures (crowding out effect
14
). If the deficit is financed from a GFS surplus (net 
debt service) the GFS balance improves. 
Figure 1: The deficit mechanism in municipal financial management 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
As the financing system is closed, it is always in balance. Therefore, if the possibility of adjusting 
revenues and expenditures is exhausted (e.g. there are no further borrowing or cost-cutting 
possibilities) an immediate adjustment takes place in expenditures by not paying the liabilities when 
due. This leads to latent bankruptcy (Vigvári, 2010) or an explicit debt settlement process: both 
resulting in direct or indirect reorganization. 
3. The financial management of the Hungarian municipalities with respect 
to the deficit mechanism 
Prior to analysing the different budgets of municipalities we have to place the entire municipal 
financial system into the framework of Hungarian public finances. 
The central government and the municipalities constitute the main subsystems of public finances. The 
total budget of the municipality sector was HUF 3,648 billion in 2010 which represents 26% of the 
total state expenditure of HUF 14,058 billion. 
                                                     
13
 Consider only revenue items which the municipality can actually influence by way of law (e.g. tax income and 
proceeds from disposals). This capacity is described by income flexibility (Vigvári, 2010). 
14
 We do not use the term crowding out effect in this study in its traditional definition related to the market 
presence of the state. By the primary crowding out effect we mean reorganization in the municipal budgets 
which is the result of the increased debt service. 
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Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on the data of the Hungarian State Treasury and 
the Central Bank of Hungary 
As it is presented by Figure 2 – the income shock caused by the bond issuances in 2007 and 2008 not 
considered − real expenditure had been increasing more intensively than revenues. A structural 
turnaround was observable in trends since 2006: a drop in real revenues was brought about – in 
addition to peaking inflation in 2007 and 2008 – by the slowing increase of block grants and other 
central transfers, and expenditures were adjusted accordingly. In the following years, municipalities 
anticipated decreasing central transfers, therefore, they started to increase their reserves (mostly 
through borrowing) which resulted in a huge total surplus in 2007 and 2008. On the other hand, a total 
deficit of HUF 155 billion had to be financed from these reserves in 2010 which was necessitated by 
the expiry of the grace period of municipal bonds (issued mostly in 2007 and 2008) and by tighter 
lending conditions on the municipal credit market, while the impact of seasonal expenditure 
characteristic to political cycles was also significant. 
The total deficit/surplus may be divided into the balance of the operating, investment (capital) and 
financing budget (Figure 3). When applying this methodology we rely on the economic classification 
we introduced in Chapter 1, starting on page 2.
16
 We used the data of the Hungarian State Treasury 
until 2010, and the budget bills for 2011 and 2012. Where it is applicable, we present the trends of the 
previous 20 years in municipal management, however, in some cases we have to focus on a narrower 
period in order to present the results in detail. In these cases we focus on the period between 2004 and 
2012 as the increasing indebtedness of the sector started in 2004, when the previously steady and 
balanced increase of cash deposits and liabilities split. 
We can state in general that surplus is typical in the operating and financing balance, while it is the 
massive deficit in the investment balance which is responsible for the total balance going into the red 
(as in 2010). 
                                                     
15
 In this study we defined real values on the basis of inflation, however, Galbács et al. (2010) introduced the 
concept of the “municipal deflator” (price index) which provides for a better estimation of the development of 
real expenditure in the municipal sector. 
16
 Note that the economic classification proposed by the Hungarian State Treasury (Form 80) corresponds to the 
classification we use in this study. 
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Figure 3: The balance of municipal budgets and the total surplus/deficit 2004-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on Budget Bill No. T/1498 and T/4365 and the 
data of the Hungarian State Treasury 
3.1. The balance of the operating budget 
Municipalities finance compulsory and voluntary public services from their own income, block grants 
and transfers coming from within and from outside public finances. Compulsory public services are 
defined by the Act on Local Governments
17
 and by numerous sectoral acts. The balance of the 
operating budget shows a surplus since the political transition in Hungary in 1990. 
However, two additional items, which are excluded from the operating budget in Form 80 of the 
Hungarian State Treasury, need to be considered in the operating budget as expenditure. Vigvári 
(2002) proposes an alternative regulation to control indebtedness according to which municipalities 
may borrow new loans only if their financial capacity provides an adequate safeguard that the annual 
debt service of these loans will be paid. To calculate this, current debt service is subtracted from the 
operating balance which provides an estimate of the puffer that can be utilized to finance further 
obligations (such as debt service) without the need for any major reorganization. Debt service is 
defined as financial expenditure by the Hungarian State Treasury, however, it is rarely refinanced from 
financial revenue in municipal management. 
The concept of financial capacity need to be extended with expenditure on the renovation of real 
estates and other assets, which represents a need for asset replacement as a consequence of 
depreciation. In cash basis accounting depreciation does not appear as a financing need (as it is not 
considered as regular expenditure 
18
). This fact is a source of increasing tension since the rebirth of the 
municipal subsystem in 1990 when the municipalities acquired significant assets free of charge but the 
related asset replacement and maintenance functions were transferred, too, to the municipalities’ scope 
of authority, without any direct central transfer provided to them. Therefore, funds have to be raised 
for these expenses by each municipality individually. 
19
 Asset replacement is defined as investment 
                                                     
17
 The Act on Local Governments of Hungary is effective from 2012. 
18
 It is accounted only in the balance sheet (against equity) and is not represented in the income statement 
(budget balance). Net (exclusive of VAT) asset replacement expenditures were far below the accounted 
depreciation between 2004 and 2010. The accumulated difference is HUF 631.8 billion, 62.1% of which results 
from the depreciation of properties. 
19
 We should note that the financing of asset replacement and renovation is also a typical driver of borrowing. 
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expenditure by the Hungarian State Treasury, however, in most cases it is not financed from capital 
revenue – except for investment grants provided by the EU for this particular purpose.
20
 
The operating balance adjusted by annual debt service and asset replacement informs the distressed 
financial situation of municipalities much better: the adjusted balance shows a deficit of HUF 158 
billion in 2010 (Figure 4). Further effects and feedback on the financing of debt service from the 
operating budget will be provided later in this study. Here, let us note only that the lack of funds in the 
financing of municipalities’ daily operation is a reality; its impact in 2010 was more significant than 
ever. The development of the adjusted operating balance is in line with the total deficit which indicates 
a dramatic decrease in reserves in 2010 (HUF 155 billion). 
Figure 4: The operating balance adjusted by annual debt service and asset replacement 2004-
2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on the data of the Hungarian State Treasury 
3.2. The balance of the investment (capital) budget 
The registry of investment (capital) revenues and expenditures accounted on cash basis involves 
certain distortions in the reporting of Hungarian municipalities. These are the following: 
 Depreciation is accounted only in the balance sheet, as a direct equity-decreasing item (see 
above). 
 Capital expenditures are accounted in one sum, concentrated to one or a few periods (pay-as-
you-go) while the utilization and the useful lifetime of the project exceeds the investment 
period (Vigvári, 2002). 
 Financial expenditures (debt service) ensure that investment expenditures will be shared 
between the years/generations equally. Figure 3 illustrates clearly that the investment budget 
shows a deficit throughout the examined period. The deficit is financed from the operating 
surplus, financial incomes and reserves. The annual debt service of loans, borrowed to finance 
investments, distributes the capital expenditures of a period between the useful years and the 
benefiting generations evenly (pay-as-you-use). 
Musgrave’s (1959) golden rule is based upon the above principles, namely, that long-term borrowings 
should finance only capital expenditures. The golden rule and the distribution of capital expenditures 
over the useful lifetime has two consequences: on the one hand, the lack of timely matching may result 
that current operating expenditures burden future years/generations or that the financing of projects 
                                                     
20
 Musgrave (1959) also represents amortization as current expenditure. 
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with a long useful lifetime may unfairly burden the current year/generation. On the other hand, the 
financed project may generate net income for the municipality during its lifetime and this may ease the 
burden the annual debt service imposes on the municipality. Therefore, it is advisable to distribute 
investment costs throughout the useful lifetime of the project (Figure 1). 
The investment intensity of Hungarian municipalities – contrary to public opinion – was balanced and 
steady in the previous 20 years. Compared to 1992, capital expenditure at current value grew to 782%, 
and increased only to 120% at real value in 2010. Moreover, these expenditures were only at the 1992 
level in 2008 and 2009. Shocks caused by the political cycles in current and real investments are 
clearly traceable on Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Current and real investment (capital) expenditures 1992-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on the data of the Hungarian State Treasury and 
the Central Bank of Hungary 
Figure 6 shows how the financing structure of investments changed in the last 20 years. The 
proportion of capital revenues was steady except for a period of dynamic increase between 1991 and 
1997 when it was between 40% and 50%. Capital revenues reached a local peak in 2010 (67.6%) 
while the proportion of the financial and operating surplus dropped. In the early 2000s capital 
revenues were comprised mostly of proceeds from asset disposal (their proportion was 40.3% in 2001 




We can conclude that municipalities need considerable financial resources to fund their investments: 
approx. 50% of capital expenditures need external – off-budget – finance. The net income generating 
ability of financed projects is uncertain, usually the maintenance and daily operation of projects 
demand additional funds from the municipality rather than generating profit to cover future debt 
service obligations. 
                                                     
21
 See Vigvári (2007) for further details on the asset disposal activity of municipalities. 
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Figure 6: The financing of capital expenditures 1992-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on Budget Bill No. T/1498 and T/4365 and the 
data of the Hungarian State Treasury 
3.3. The balance of the GFS budget 
The balance of the GFS budget is one of the most significant indicators in the financial management of 
the general government. This balance does not take into account borrowings and other financial 
transactions on the capital market, however, proceeds from the disposal of assets as one-off, free to use 
items are included in the balance. The GFS balance is the result of operating and investment revenues 
and expenditures. 
Figure 7: The composition and development of the “European” GFS balance of the general 
government 1995-2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office 
The GFS balance of the municipalities, which is prepared on cash basis, is consolidated into the 
general government balance. This balance (which mostly shows deficit) is the anchor of the central 
government’s fiscal policy. The requirements of the Maastricht Treaty concern the general government 
balance adjusted to accrual basis (the “European” GFS), and the government, too, assumed an 
obligation towards the European Union and investors to fulfil these requirements on accrual basis. 
The proportion of municipal deficit in the consolidated general government deficit has been steadily 
growing since 2008 and it peaked at 20% in 2010 (Figure 7). In the same year, the government’s 
municipal deficit target was HUF 180.7 billion but was exceeded, with HUF 220.2 billion according to 
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final figures. This excessive deficit, added to the “unexpected” spending of the central government (in 
total HUF 74.7 billion) moved the budget deficit significantly away from the original target (4.2% 
instead of 3.8%). 
The unexpected growth of the “European” GFS balance is reflected also in the GFS balance prepared 
on cash basis (Figure 8). 27.5% of the HUF 232 billion municipal GFS deficit could be attributed to 
the budgets of cities with county rights (HUF 63.8 billion), as Budapest and the capital districts were 
responsible for “only” 22.3% 
22
 of the deficit. The proportion of the external and internal sources used 
to finance this deficit is 33-67%, which is shown in Figure 3 in the financing and total balance. 
Figure 9: The calculation and development of the municipal GFS balance 2004-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on Budget Bill No. T/1498 and T/4365 and the 
data of the Hungarian State Treasury 
The GFS balance also indicates how great is the financing need of the operating and the investment 
budget of municipalities. The composition and examination of the balance shows clearly the nature 
and structural properties of the financing need of the sector. This need may be satisfied from reserves, 
from borrowings, or from both. 
3.4. The development of reserves 
Reserves in the municipality budgets are labelled according to their origin, namely, they can be 
budgetary or business reserves. Reserves accumulated from municipal bond issuances are considered 
as special budgetary reserves. These assets are mostly invested in demand and time deposits or state 
bonds. Figure 10 illustrates the development of the balance of cash and deposits, together with bank 
liabilities. 
The balance of cash and deposits had been increasing steadily and consistently with the balance of 
liabilities until the end of 2003. Since 2004, the year of Hungary’s accession to the European Union, 
the growth of liabilities has been exceeding the growth of cash and deposits, which might be the result 
of the (pre) financing of EU-funded investments. The accumulation of reserves became the driving 
force of municipal credit demand in 2007 and 2008: municipal cash and deposits were increasing 
significantly as a result of the popularity of municipal bond issuances which, in turn, were driven by 
the reserving motive. The reasons behind reserving were the following: 
                                                     
22
 The complete division of the 2010 municipal GFS86 balance: cities with county rights − HUF 63.8 billion, 
towns − HUF 58.9 billion, counties − HUF 31.5 billion, Budapest − HUF 26.3 billion, villages − HUF 25.9 
billion, capital districts − HUF 25.5 billion. 
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 The central government made steps to strengthen the control over municipal borrowings in 
2007
23
 which in the end did not come into force (owing to the lack of 2/3 supporting majority 
in the Parliament) (Vasvári, 2009). 
 The settlement and drawdown of market and refinanced loans is complicated, unlike bonds, 
the proceeds of which are free-to-use (Gál, 2010). Loan instruments are not suitable for 
reserving purposes as many of the lending conditions are fixed and specific (e.g. commitment 
period). 
 Bond issuances are not subject to the Act on Public Procurement. 
Figure 10: The municipal loan-to-deposit ratio and its composition 1992-2011Q2 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on the data of the Central Bank of Hungary 
The increasing, mostly reserve-driven credit demand also met an increasing credit supply − with 
looser conditions as banks had to pay a low margin on interbank foreign exchange funds. 
24
 The 
municipalities deposited the external funds they acquired mostly from foreign currency denominated 
bond issuances into HUF accounts, exchanged. This meant a favourable carry trade 
25
 position for the 
municipalities while the banks could collect HUF funds at a discount price. The exchange rate risk 
implied in the conversion rested upon the municipalities. The expansion of the municipal credit market 
might also be driven by oligopoly competition: based on credit value, seven financial institutions 
dominate 97% of the municipal financing market (MNB, 2011). The rating of municipalities was also 
enhanced by faith in the operational continuity of municipalities, which means that a municipality 
cannot be terminated without a successor and their income cannot be fully depleted (Homolya-Szigel, 
2008). Due to these facts and to certain information asymmetries characteristic of the sector, the 
margins payable above the reference rates of municipal loans and bonds cannot be considered reliable 
risk indicators. Gál (2010) states that the rating and risk of municipalities is reflected primarily by the 
non-interest conditions of credit instruments (maturity, collateral, credit line, additional commitments). 
The revaluation effect of foreign exchange liabilities and the drop in reserves caused increasing 
deterioration in the net financial assets of the municipalities which is also represented by a 362% loan-
to-deposit ratio in 2010.
26
 
                                                     
23
 Bill No. T/4320 on the amendment of Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments, 9 November 2007 
24
 See further details in Páles-Homolya (2011). 
25
 See further details in Vasvári (2009). 
26
 Based on the System of National Accounts prepared by the Central Bank of Hungary (S.1313). 
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3.5. The role of debt service 
The impact and feedback effects of debt service will be examined in detail later in this study. We note 
here only that refinancing principal payments (debt service 
27
) from financial revenue (borrowing) is 
common practice in the public sector. This does not trigger an increase in indebtedness as revenue and 
expenditure are netted within the financial budget, only the total budget is grossed up. However, the 
financing of current expenditures (such as interest and other bank fees) from financial revenues 
increases indebtedness. In addition, underlying credit that refinances debt service involves a secondary 
crowding out effect as well: as the municipality is not able to decrease its indebtedness it will be 
unable to get new funds to finance its ongoing investments. 
4. The indebtedness of municipalities 
Municipal debt forms part of the consolidated general government debt. In spite of this, the state does 
not stand surety for municipal liabilities directly and there is only a passive control on debt service 
defined by law 
28
 in order to limit the indebtedness of municipalities until 2011. Kovács (2007), 
Homolya-Szigel (2008), Aczél-Homolya (2011) and Vasvári (2009) conclude that this regulation does 
not constitute an effective limit on municipal borrowing. The consequences are the following: 
 There is no state bail-out in cases of municipal insolvency, although, with the recent turbulent 
market conditions in view, any possible debt settlement process may increase the sovereign 
risk of Hungary (Aczél-Homolya, 2011). The consequences of previous debt settlement 
processes is analysed in detail by Jókay and Veres-Bocskay (2009), Gál (2010) and Aczél-
Homolya (2011). 
 As the borrowing limit was not effective, the indebtedness of municipalities may increase only 
through the control of financial institutions. The municipal debts are consolidated into the 
public debt. Figure 11 shows that the development of municipal debt (with the exchange rate 
effect excluded) is similar to the trend that the development of public debt follows, however, 
on a significantly smaller scale. 
Public debt – in addition to the budget deficit – is one of the few significant indicators that investors 
seriously take into account. 
29
 Therefore, it is also regarded as a fiscal anchor in the economic policy of 
the government and is included among the Maastricht criteria as well. The statutory borrowing limit 
we have cited above maximizes debt service per municipality, however, it does not contain any 
restrictions with regard to breach of the regulation. Although the calculus of the limit was adopted by 
the banks with certain adjustments (Vasvári, 2009), earlier (until 2009) it was not in their interest to 
enforce restrictions on the municipalities. Higher interest rates (margins), tighter lending conditions or 
a credit-stop would have entailed a drop in their market share and defeat in the credit competition. 
Municipal debt compared to public debt was only 1% in 2010 but increased to 6% by the end of the 
first half of 2011. The public debt/ to GDP ratio grew from 59.4% to 82.5% in this period, while the 
contribution of municipal debt to the total debt ratio rose from 1% to 4.7%. 
                                                     
27
 For the purposes of this study and unless otherwise indicated debt service is equivalent to principal payments. 
Interest and other fee obligations are considered as operating expenditures. 
28
 See the Act on Local Governments 
29
 This statement is even more actual in the recent debt-crisis sweeping through Europe and the US. 
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Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on the data of the Central Bank of Hungary 
The most typical instruments of municipal borrowing are long-term loans and municipal bonds. Their 
share in financing was almost equal, 52%-48% at current value, at the end of the first half of 2011. The 
majority of bank liabilities were denominated in foreign currency and their share in the same period 
was 61.7%. The revaluation of these debts may have the following consequences: 
 Higher exchange rates increase the debt service of loans/bonds, which boosts the crowding out 
effect of debt service as well. Potential feedback effects include the improvement of the GFS 
balance (reorganization motive), the deterioration of the total balance (the spending of 
reserves) or the increase/maintenance of the level of indebtedness (restructuring motive). The 
profitability of financed projects may also be required to increase. 
 Revaluations are non-realized gains/losses. The accounting of revenues/expenses from 
revaluation happens only through interest or principal payments (or prepayment). 
 Revaluations are consolidated into the public debt. The virtual municipal debt increase issuing 
from revaluation was HUF 174.4 billion 
31
 at the end of the first half of 2011, only 0.8% of 
total public debt. 
 Revaluations – like depreciation – are accounted on cash basis and appear only in the balance 
sheet, between equity and liabilities. 
We can conclude that the debt of municipalities is not significant relative to consolidated public debt. 
Therefore, municipal indebtedness in itself does not cause structural concerns. However, the 
amortization (debt service) of municipal indebtedness needs careful attention as it can affect the 
economic policy, management and performance of both municipalities and the central government. 
4.1. Motivating factors behind municipal indebtedness 
Previously we have introduced the possible theoretical motives of increasing municipal indebtedness. 
In this short chapter, we will quantify and weigh the different motives that have been stimulating 
municipal borrowing since 2004 (Figure 12). 
Funded projects must be specified in loan agreements or in bond documents (including the information 
memorandum). This may limit the drawdown of loan funds significantly, while the debiting of funds 
                                                     
30
 In order to provide a better illustration Figure 11 displays only one tenth of the total public debt. 
31
 Constituting 14% of total municipal debt at the end of the first half of 2011. 
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from bond issuances may be less restricted. 
32
 In spite of this, municipalities generally aim to define 
viable long-term projects when issuing bonds. 




Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on Budget Bill No. T/1498 and the data of the 
Hungarian State Treasury and the Central Bank of Hungary 
Borrowings were used to finance the GFS deficit from 2004 to 2006, however, the intention behind the 
“boom” of municipal bond issuances in 2007 was mostly to accumulate reserves and state bonds, 
while only HUF 25 billion was spent on counterbalancing the GFS deficit. The refinancing of loans 
was not a significant motive. Reserves continued to increase in 2008, driven by the sustained bond 
“boom” and by the surplus of the GFS budget. A slight decrease was perceptible in long-term loans, 
which was probably the result of ordinary debt service or refinancing. As the municipal credit market 
was frozen and there was a lack of any other options, in 2009 municipalities financed their GFS deficit 
mostly from reserves. Although the municipal credit market “melted” in the following (election) year 
(with HUF 66 billion of new borrowings), the largest part of the peaking GFS deficit was financed 
from reserves. This trend continued in 2011. 
We can conclude, then, that the refinancing of debt is not a typical practice in the municipal sector. 
HUF 662 billion in funds was spent on GFS deficit from 2004 to 2011Q2, the biggest share of which 
was used to finance municipal investment activity, including own contribution to EU tenders. 
Meanwhile, in 2007 and 2008 municipal bond issuances were driven by the desire to accumulate 
reserves, however, there were only HUF 71 billion left of the reserved HUF 349 billion by the end of 
the first half of 2011. This drop in reserves was brought forth by newly launched projects and the lack 
of credit funds in 2009 and 2010. The extra funds from bond issuances covered structural deficiencies 
which were revealed when cash started to shrink from 2009, 3-4 years later than due owing to the 
grace period of bonds. 
Moreover, financing items are not included in the GFS budget, therefore, spending external 
(borrowing) or internal (reserve) resources to finance GFS expenditures (operating or investment) 
causes a direct deterioration in the GFS balance. 
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 Except if banks agree with the municipalities about the restriction of fundable items. 
33
 For the GFS balance of the first half of 2011 we considered 50% of the planned balance in the Budget Bill for 
2011. 
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5. Debt service 
The debt service related to municipal indebtedness poses a significant challenge to the executives of 
municipalities and also to bank managers. In the following, we will review experiences and 
anticipations regarding municipal debt service and evaluate the crowding out effect the deficit 
mechanism gives rise to. 
The repayment of short-term loans lagged behind the repayment of short-term borrowings in 2010 
(HUF 57 billion compared to HUF 111 billion) that resulted in a peak in the increase of short-term 
liabilities at HUF 54 billion, treble the previous record of HUF 18 billion in 2006. In particular, 
overdraft loans amounted to HUF 116 billion in the middle of 2011 (Aczél-Homolya, 2011), so the 
liquid loan financing of municipalities, in which the municipalities “got stuck” as a result of the 
unfavourable financing structure of their daily operation in the previous years, is significant. 
The debt service of long-term loans has been steady since 2004 (HUF 51 billion in 2010); the 
weighted average of their maturity since 2004 is calculated at 8.4 years. Compared to municipal bonds 
the maturity of loans is 10 years shorter. As the Successful Hungary Municipal Infrastructure 
Development Loan Programme launched by the Hungarian Development Bank in the past few years 
includes a grace period for principal payments, too, the estimation may be distorted. 
The debt service related to municipal bonds was the lowest in 2010 (HUF 14 billion), but on the 
increase. This can be traced back to the grace period on principal payments, however, the amortization 
of loans in certain cases includes increasing, “progressive” principal payments over the maturity 
period. 
Now we will estimate the future municipal debt service of each credit instrument, respectively, with 
the level of short-term loans considered unchanged (as short-term loans are repaid and borrowed in 
each fiscal year).  
To estimate the debt service of municipal bonds we used the collected data of a previous study 
(Vasvári, 2009). The estimation of expected reference rates and exchange rates are carried out along 
three different scenarios.
34
 The calculation shows that the debt service of municipal bonds will peak in 
2014−2015 at HUF 55 billion (Figure 13). This represents a significant increase compared to the 
estimated (HUF 11 billion) debt service in 2010. 
With the debt service of long-term loans
35
 added to our calculations, the burden debt service imposes 
on the municipal sector may be over HUF 100 billion in 2015. There is a significant drop in debt 
service observable in 2027 and 2028 as the majority of municipal bonds issued in 2007-2008 have an 
initial maturity period of 20 years. 
While regulations are weak growing debt service has a significant effect on the management of 
municipalities, as hundreds of billions of forints have to be repaid as debt service in the following 
years. This demand – given the closed financing system of municipalities − can be satisfied only from 
four different sources: the (1) operating, (2) investment (capital) and (3) financing budgets or from (4) 
reserves. 
                                                     
34
 Estimation conditions and the macro variables assigned to each scenario are included in the appendix. 
35
 We assumed a maturity period of 10 years for existing debts as of the end of 2010, without any new long-term 
borrowings. The possible grace period of loans is ignored. 
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Source: Author’s calculations and elaboration based on the data of the Hungarian State Treasury, the 
Act on Municipalities and Government Decree No. 353/2011 (XII. 30) 
Nevertheless, the revenue arising from financed projects may be used as the primary source to fund 
debt service, lessening this way the burden on the ordinary cash flow of municipal budgets. Most 
municipal-financed projects, however, do not generate net revenue, therefore, financing debt service 
from project revenues – as we have mentioned earlier – is not typical in Hungary. 
There are two possible ways to finance debt service from investment revenues: either from proceeds 
from asset disposal or from investment subsidies granted by the state or the EU. Both can be used to 
finance asset replacement, i.e. debt service related to long-term project loans or bonds. However, if the 
debt service is related to bonds or loans that served the purpose of financing operating activities 
(deficit), it is considered as the “consuming” of assets, and thus, breach of the golden rule. 
Increasing debt service may also result in the adjustment of investment expenditures, however, these 
obligations are in the most cases contractually fixed. Moreover, the proportion of non-refundable 
subsidies in EU funded projects is high, therefore, municipalities rarely postpone or cancel their 
projects in the short run because of an increase in debt service. If investment plans are considered in 
the long run, municipalities may cancel projects in order to have sufficient funds to cover debt service. 
In this case, the crowding out effect of increased debt service appears only in the long run. 
The refinancing of debt service or prepayment from financial revenue (new borrowings) is called the 
debt spiral. Liquid loans, which are borrowed and repaid within a year, constitute an exception as these 
items gross the total budget but do not bring forth the deterioration of the balance. However, a 
secondary crowding out effect is also involved: as the municipality cannot decrease its indebtedness it 
will be unable to get new funds to finance its on-going investments. It also indicates a serious problem 
if municipalities spend further borrowings on the current interest and bank fee obligations of existing 
loans, which again increases their indebtedness. 
Our conclusion is that municipalities should accumulate funds in their operating budget in order to 
finance debt service. This has a twofold effect on their daily operation. On the one hand, 
municipalities may increase their controllable revenue 
37
 which translates into an increase in the rates 
                                                     
36
 Based on estimated debt service for the period starting from 2011. The rest of the variables are fixed at the 
2010 value. 
37
 The need for a “painful” increase in controllable revenues may be decreased by extraordinary and operation 
deficit (ÖNHIKI) grants received from the central government. 
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and bases of taxes, or a review of tax discounts. The collection policy of municipal (tax-)receivables 
may also be tightened. On the other hand, the increased debt service may compel municipalities to 
decrease expenditures, which would require a complex and comprehensive reorganization. 
Municipalities may initiate measures to meet the criteria of the 3Es 
38
 (efficiency, effectiveness, 
economy) (Vigvári, 2005) or suspend the provision of voluntary public services. 
If there is a lack of necessary funds in the operating and investment balance to cover debt service debt 
has to be financed from reserves, which will appear in the total deficit of municipalities. Financing 
debt service from reserves does not influence the net financial assets 
39
 of municipalities negatively, 
however, the payment of additional interests and fees from reserves accelerates the depletion of 
financial assets. 
Reorganization, adjustments in the investment budget (e.g. postponing investments) or the depletion of 
reserves are direct results of the crowding out effect caused by (increasing) debt service: an increase 
in financial expenditures can be financed only through the adjustment of either revenues or other 
expenditures. If this does not succeed expenditures will be adjusted to revenues as the closed financing 
system stays always in balance. In practice this means that liabilities become overdue and payments 
may even be suspended (note that according to the cash method there is no accounting in this case), 
which leads to latent bankruptcy (Vigvári, 2010). In this case, committed liabilities cannot be financed 
from revenues and reserves (insolvency, weak financial standing) and at the end of the process the 
municipality goes “bankrupt” and the municipal debt settlement process begins.
40
 
Financing debt service from the operating or the investment budget results in the recovery of the GFS 
balance as financial expenditures are below-the-line items in the GFS budget. Thus, increasing debt 
service entails a favourable structural feedback on the consolidated GFS balance of the general 
government. 
Conclusions considering the new municipal framework  
Figure 15 summarises briefly the conclusions of this study, that is, how the inter-budget financing of 
deficit affects municipal management. 
While we discuss our conclusions regarding the effects of the deficit mechanism on the management 
of municipalities we will also touch upon and evaluate the relevant paragraphs of the acts recently 
introduced to reform municipal management. 
Municipalities can take only insufficient measures (from an economic point of view) to finance their 
operating deficit which is indicative of structural issues. The Act on Economic Stability of Hungary 
restricts the temporary and prohibits the year-end financing of operating deficit from borrowings. 
According to the Act on Local Governments of Hungary, a new (service-based) financing system will 
be introduced from 2013, which is planned to eliminate deficit arising from the delivery of public 
services on the required level. 
41
 The consequence of this new system is, on the one hand, that 
municipalities may finance operation only from liquid loans (redeemable within a year) from 2012. 
                                                     
38
 E.g. more efficient cash management, centralized procurement, the review and tightening of cost management 
and procurement processes. 
39
 See details on the net financial assets in Vigvári (2010). 
40
 To avoid or ease these burdens municipalities often initiate re-negotiation, review or restructuring of 
contracted liabilities, e.g. loan restructuring, payment discounts or instalment payment. 
41
 A deficit cannot be planned from that year on either. 
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Therefore, municipalities have to get rid of their existing liquid debts they got “stuck in” in recent 
years (HUF 116 billion in 2010). The total repayment of these liquid loans would result in a significant 
crowding out effect, however, it is more likely that these loans (mostly overdrafts) will be converted to 
term loans with a definite maturity and the full amount will be prepaid in fixed instalments, which will 
distribute the crowding out effect evenly. Moreover, as the financing of year-end operating deficit 
from borrowings is prohibited from 2012 (one year before the introduction of the new financing 
system) the intensity of the crowding out effect will increase further. At the same time, the law (in 
force from 2013) allows the operating deficit to be financed from other budgets, such as investment 
revenues and reserves. Therefore, the phenomenon of the operating deficit itself will not be resolved, 
only its inter-budget financing limited. It must also be noted that unforeseen increases in debt service 
(i.e. due to the exchange rate and reference rate risk) intensify the reorganization and crowding out 
effect, which remains a problem even if debt service is declared as compulsory public service. Either 
with or without the declaration it is still uncertain what funds the municipalities will rely on to finance 
debt service from 2013.  
Figure 15: Inter-budget financing and its effect on municipal management 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
We can conclude that asset replacement is closely related to the provision of public services at the 
required level and can cause significant – uncontrolled – GFS deficit if it is not declared as 
compulsory public service. Therefore, it is advisable to include these expenditures in the new 
financing system in force from 2013. 
Borrowing is a highly applicable means to satisfy the significant financing need of the municipal 
investment budget, as it realises the pay-as-you-use principle (the distribution of investment 
expenditure among the benefiting generations) (Vigvári, 2002). This is the only fair and economic 
option, as financing projects from operation savings would result in the postponing of investments 
because of insufficient funds. The Act on Economic Stability of Hungary states that municipal 
borrowing is subject to governmental approval. 
42
  
                                                     
42
 The Act establishes the following borrowing purposes as exceptions: prefinancing and own contribution of 
subsidies, reorganization loans taken out during a debt settlement process, liquid loans, loans under HUF 100 
million requested by Budapest and cities with county rights, loans under HUF 10 million requested by other 
municipalities. 
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According to the Act, the government approves – exclusively investment-related – municipal 
borrowings if the project concerned remains within the new borrowing limit (see below), if it does not 
mean any threat to the target for consolidated public debt set in the current year’s budget act, and if 
sufficient capacity is reserved in the budget for the provision of public services and the payment of 
additional debt service without default. 
43
 In spite of these, the government should focus more on the 
nature of municipal investments rather than on borrowings. The reasons for establishing more active 
control over capital expenditures are the following: 
 This assessment or reviewing function may fit in well with the new role of county 
municipalities regarding urban and regional development management. It is important that 
independent or elected institutions should review the initiated project in order to ensure that a 
neutral decision, representative of the priorities of the voting public is made. This would also 
accelerate the decision-making process. 
 By reviewing projects, investment related funds − including borrowings − could be indirectly 
approved. As only investment related long-term borrowings are allowed by the law from 2012, 
further indebtedness could also be kept under control. 
 The GFS balance shows the net internal (reserves) or external (borrowing) financing need of a 
municipality. As financial revenues are not included in the GFS budget, spending borrowings 
on GFS expenditures, such as investments, would result in the deterioration of the sectoral and 
the consolidated GFS balance as well. Although the Act on Local Governments declares that 
municipal borrowings have to comply with the consolidated debt target stated in the budget 
act each year, we can conclude that − as municipal debts are immaterial in the public debt – 
the control over the spending of financial revenue is lax. Moreover, the Act does not consider 
borrowings for own contribution and the pre-financing of subsidies, which enhances the 
weaknesses of the regulation and lets GFS deficit go out of control. 
 Focusing on investments would prevent a draft loan agreement, applied for in a time- and 
cost-consuming public procurement process, to be refused by the government. 
 Focusing on investments would prevent the increase of indebtedness driven by the reserving 
motive and, consequently, speculation on the money market would also disappear. 
 The Act on Local Governments of Hungary stipulates state suretyship for the completion of 
projects subsidized by the EU (in case municipal insolvency threatens the drawdown of 
subsidies). Therefore, the government should track and monitor municipal investments 
throughout the life of the project. 
 The focus on investments may also facilitate the launching and execution of a more 
comprehensive framework for regional and national development that would guide municipal 
investments, as well. This would be essential as municipalities are responsible for about 50% 
of state investments (Vigvári, 2011). 
Some of these thoughts are reflected by Government Decree No. 353/2011. (XII. 30.), as it prescribes 
a reporting obligation for municipalities regarding their investments in the pipeline in the current fiscal 
year (the relevance of investments to compulsory public services must also be stated). In the approval 
process of each draft loan agreement the purpose of the loan is checked against the submitted 
investment list – although in special cases this may be ignored. However, this practice means only a 
weak control over the nature and timing of investments, as it only rejects ad-hoc investments and 
                                                     
43
 The incorporation of this provision in the Act on Economic Stability is very welcome, as Vigvári (2002) also 
proposes the introduction of the term “financial capacity” into the control of municipal indebtedness. The 
practical consequence of the crowding out effect is in fact that it establishes the sufficient financial capacity to 
finance debt service – subsequently. 
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explicitly reserve-driven borrowings. Moreover, the government is the subject of the decision making 
and the escalation process over three levels 
44
 slows the administration considerably. 
45
 
The debt service of investment related borrowings may be covered primarily from the net project 
revenue of financed projects, however, there is no net revenue requirement laid down for Hungarian 
municipality projects, and sometimes they even result in increasing operating expenditures. 
Investment revenue can finance only investment related debt service that arises either from loans pre-
financing EU subsidies or borrowings that finance new assets or asset replacement. All other cases 
presuppose structural deficiencies. 
If the origin of both the reserves and the debt service is an investment activity, reserves can be spent 
on the debt service without risking structural issues. However, financing debt service from reserves 
that originate from borrowings may lead to the deterioration or closing of the carry trade position 
which, in turn, decreases interest gains while the net financial assets of the municipality remain 
constant. 
The Act on Economic Stability of Hungary allows the refinancing of debt service or the prepayment of 
loans from financial incomes (borrowings). We have to note, however, that the refinancing of loans is 
currently not timely and is not to be expected, as municipalities got funds with more favourable 
conditions and a long maturity prior to the economic crisis. Refinancing would also mean the 
realization of unfavourable exchange rate conditions in the case of foreign currency funds. 
46
  
As a consequence of the deficit mechanism, the occurrence or growth of debt service – given the lack 
of any project revenues – results in a drop in reserves, the “consuming” of assets, reorganization, 
refinancing, or, in the worst case, a debt settlement process. Regarding the transitional year of 2012 the 
government should consider a reform of reorganization loans, which would allow municipalities to 
apply for an interest subsidy without being in a state of bankruptcy. This would give municipalities 
impetus for early reorganization in order to avoid a debt settlement process and would also enable 
municipalities to refinance their loans at lower – state-subsidized – rates. Moreover, reorganization, 
the earlier the better, would stop or slow the “consumption” of assets and reserves. 
The indebtedness of municipalities and the revaluation risk resulting from high foreign currency 
exposure is not significant in terms of consolidated public debt; it does not entail serious structural 
issues. In spite of this, the debt service of municipal debt, where applicable, imposes a great burden on 
each municipality. The profession has been proposing modification of the methodology with regard to 
the ineffective borrowing limit for years. As opposed to the short-term, current-year focus defined by 
the Act on Local Governments, the Act on Economic Stability of Hungary sets requirements for debt 
service throughout the entire maturity period. Although the formula used for the calculation of the 
borrowing limit also changed, 
47
 this will not mean a significant change in practice, as – based on our 
                                                     
44
 1. The competent regional directorate of the Hungarian State Treasury 2. The regional government office or 
the Government Office of the Capital City 3. The government acting upon minister’s proposal (including the 
Minister for Municipal Affairs and the Minister for Public Finances). 
45
 According to the quoted regulation the time frame of a decision is ca. 2-3 months. With the prior public 
procurement process also considered, the full administration of a loan agreement may last for even 4-5 months. 
46
 For this reason, municipalities rather request the extension of the grace period of existing bonds/loans. 
47
 From 2012 own revenues do not include the income from motor tax, administration fees and interests. 
Proceeds from sureties and asset disposal, on the other hand, are included in the calculation. Payments to trade 
debtors and replacement expenditures related to assets in concession are not considered as limit-decreasing items 
from 2012. The limit ratio sank from 70% to 50%, while – according to the new formula – own revenues have to 
be discounted with the ratio prior to the consideration of liabilities (until 2011 liabilities were deducted from own 
The deficit mechanism of the Hungarian municipalities 
303 
prior estimation – the municipal sector will be free to run up debt with an additional debt service of 
HUF 125 billion until the new borrowing limit is reached. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Macro variables in each scenario considered in the estimation of the debt service of 
municipal bonds from November 2011 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 2: Parameters considered in the estimation of the debt service of municipal bonds 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: The parameters represented above were applied to bond issuances if the requested data were not 
available. The parameters are volume-weighted values. Interest and principal payment periods were 
set at 3 months and 6 months on a 50-50% basis. 
 
